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Abstract
The scope of financial systemic risk research encompasses a wide range of interbank
channels and effects, including asset correlation shocks, default contagion, illiquidity
contagion, and asset fire sales. This paper introduces a financial network model that
combines the default and liquidity stress mechanisms into a “double cascade mapping”.
The progress and eventual result of the crisis is obtained by iterating this mapping to
its fixed point. Unlike simpler models, this model can therefore quantify how illiquidity
or default of one bank influences the overall level of liquidity stress and default in the
system. Large-network asymptotic cascade mapping formulas are derived that can be
used for efficient network computations of the double cascade. Numerical experiments
then demonstrate that these asymptotic formulas agree qualitatively with Monte Carlo
results for large finite networks, and quantitatively except when the initial system is
placed in an exceptional “knife-edge” configuration. The experiments clearly support
the main conclusion that when banks respond to liquidity stress by hoarding liquidity,
then in the absence of asset fire sales, the level of defaults in a financial network is
negatively related to the strength of bank liquidity hoarding and the eventual level of
stress in the network.
Keywords: Systemic risk, banking network, contagion, random graph, default, funding
liquidity, liquidity hoarding.
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1 Introduction
Since the banking crisis of 2007-2008, the types of shocks transmitted through in-
terbank networks during a crisis now thought to be important include not only
shocks arising from defaulting banks, but a number of additional phenomena, most
notably asset shocks originating with forced sales by banks of illiquid assets and
funding liquidity shocks as illiquid banks recall loans from other banks. A com-
prehensive treatment of these contagion effects and how they can be computed in
stylized financial network specifications can be found in Hurd (2016).
A well-developed strand of literature on bank default cascade models, starting
with Eisenberg & Noe (2001) and reviewed in Upper (2011), is based on a network
of banks wherein insolvency of a given bank, defined as a bank whose net worth
becomes non-positive, will generate shocks to the asset side of the balance sheet of
each of its creditor banks. Under some circumstances, such “downstream” shocks
can cause further insolvencies that may build up to create a global insolvency cas-
cade. One such contribution is by Nier, Yang, Yorulmazer & Alentorn (2007) that
uses Monte Carlo simulation to determine how the key network parameters for their
model of defaults in a stylized random network of 25 banks can influence the total
number of defaults in a nonlinear, indeed sometimes nonmonotonic, fashion. The
paper of Gai & Kapadia (2010a) and its extension by Hurd & Gleeson (2011), adapt
the Watts (2002) network model of information cascades to the context of financial
systems, deriving both analytical and Monte Carlo results for the dependence of the
default cascade on different structural parameters. May & Arinaminpathy (2010)
present approximate analytical formulas for the Nier et al model and Gai-Kapadia
model that can explain some of the main properties of the simulation results found
in those papers. Amini, Cont & Minca (2012) and Amini, Cont & Minca (2016)
develop a simple but general analytical criterion for resilience to default contagion,
based on an asymptotic analysis of default cascades in heterogeneous networks.
More recently, after remarking on the observed “freezing” of interbank lending
around the time of the Lehman collapse, papers by Gai & Kapadia (2010b), Gai,
Haldane & Kapadia (2011) and Lee (2013) adopt variations of an idea that fund-
ing illiquiditya of a bank can also be transmitted contagiously through interbank
exposures. They argue that a bank whose liquid assets are insufficient to cover de-
mands on its liabilities will be illiquid or “stressed”, and must reduce its interbank
lending, thereby creating shocks to the liability side of its debtor banks’ balance
sheets. Such “upstream” shocks can cause illiquidity stress in other banks that in
some circumstances may build up to create a global illiquidity cascade.
A third channel, sometimes called market illiquidity or the asset fire sale effect,
is identified by Cifuentes, Ferrucci & Shin (2005) who consider a network of banks
aFunding illiquidity, being the insufficiency of liquid assets to cover a run on liabilities, is
distinct from market illiquidity, where assets become difficult to sell due to an oversupply in the
market. See Tirole (2010) and Brunnermeier & Pedersen (2009) for a detailed analysis of these
concepts.
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that hold a common asset. As stress in the system builds up, some banks are
forced to sell large positions in the illiquid asset, leading to a downward price spiral
coupled to worsening bank balance sheets across the network. This mechanism has
been extended to the sharing of multiple assets in a paper by Caccioli, Shrestha,
Moore & Farmer (2014).
These papers simplify by omitting economic details that obscure their focus on
a single channel of systemic risk. They share the view that the end result of a
crisis is a new equilibrium that is reached through a sequence of mechanistic steps
where banks update and modify their balance sheets in response to price changes
and shocks transmitted from other banks. Usually, properties of the system at
step n of the cascade can be computed in terms of the properties at step n − 1,
yielding a set of equations that can be called a cascade mapping. In some models,
an analytic cascade mapping can be found that yields a detailed picture of systemic
risk without the need for Monte Carlo simulation based computations. Even in
such cases however, large scale benchmarking of the analytic approximation method
against Monte Carlo simulations is undertaken to validate its use.
An important question now arises whether one can successfully integrate two or
more such cascade mechanisms, incorporate “spillover” effects in a realistic, ana-
lytically tractable way, and discern new features of systemic risk. The purpose of
the present paper is to do exactly this, by introducing a network model of a double
illiquidity-insolvency cascade, and deriving an analytic cascade mapping that de-
scribes it. This double cascade model, shown schematically in Figure 1, can resolve
issues not addressable within a single cascade model, for example, to quantify the
effect of a bank’s behavioural response to liquidity stress on the level of eventual
defaults in the entire system. In particular, one can show that a bank that reacts
to stress at a time of crisis by shrinking its own interbank lending, thereby inflict-
ing liquidity shocks to its debtor banks, will also protect itself from default due to
interbank default shocks.
In the literature on how contagion channels “spill over” into each other, Diamond
& Rajan (2005) explain the liquidity, solvency and behaviour of banks through the
role they play in intermediating between lenders and borrowers. As discussed in
Tirole (2010), the holding of very illiquid assets can cause solvent banks (those
with positive equity) to default due to their inability to raise enough liquidity to
meet short-term needs. Battiston, Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald & Stiglitz (2012)
model the robustness dynamics of a network of banks linked by their interbank
exposures, highlighting the feedback effects of a “financial accelerator” mechanism
on the level of systemic risk. Roukny, Bersini, Pirotte, Caldarelli & Battiston (2013)
further develop this idea, investigating the systemic impact of network topologies
and different levels of market illiquidity and applying this methodology to the Italian
interbank money market from 1999 to 2011.
It should be made clear that in order to focus on pure contagion effects, the
double cascade model and the above models simplify by explicitly ruling out certain
other systemic mechanisms that have been explored in the economics and finance
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Figure 1: A schematic diagram of part of a financial network, showing
banks and their balance sheets connected by directed edges represent-
ing interbank exposures. Default shocks are transmitted in the forward
“downstream” direction, while liquidity or stress shocks are transmitted
in the upstream direction.
literature. In the present paper, the most important economic effect that is ruled
out is the asset “fire sale”, which means that for the duration of the crisis, changing
values of fixed assets are ignored. Some of the above references discuss the impact
of financial cascades on the non-financial economy and the consequent feedback into
the financial markets. They find that fire sales of assets amplify any cascade that
takes hold in the network. It will be an important future challenge to extend our
double cascade framework to include the fire sale effect and determine whether our
main conclusions are robust to such an extension.
Section 2 of the paper sets out the network framework and assumptions underly-
ing the balance sheet structure of banks, the timing of the crisis and bank behaviour.
These assumptions lead to stock flow consistent rules for the transmission of shocks
through the double stress/default cascade, including the conditions for banks to
become stressed or defaulted. Section 3 develops our main technical contribution,
which yields an explicit analytic cascade mapping for default and stress probabil-
ities valid in a large heterogeneous network of banks with random balance sheets
and interbank exposures and connectivity given by a random “skeleton”. Section 4
provides a parallel development of default and stress probabilities for cascades on
networks where it is assumed that the skeleton of interbank connections is known
explicitly, but balance sheets and exposure sizes are random. Several representative
financial experiments are reported in Section 5. First we summarize experiments
that validate the accuracy of the cascade mapping by direct comparison of large
network analytics to Monte Carlo simulation results. Secondly, we investigate the
relationship between the level of stress and default, verifying our assertion that av-
erage default probability decreases as average stress probability increases. A final
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experiment demonstrates that our analysis is still useful when pushed to a highly
heterogeneous specification of the model that is consistent with known heuristics
of financial networks, such as fat-tailed degree and exposure distributions, and the
2011 stress testing data on 90 large banks in the EU system. We observed that the
stylized EU network is very resilient, and only extremely large shocks to the average
default buffer size will trigger a cascade of defaulted and stressed banks.
One conclusion of this paper is that our analytic asymptotic results on default
and stress probabilities are broadly consistent with results from Monte Carlo sim-
ulations on random networks. A second conclusion is that under the assumption
of no asset fire sales, stress and default are inversely related: as banks respond to
stress more vigorously, creating more network stress, they protect the network from
default. It is left for future work to determine the extent to which this conclusion
is valid when a fire sale mechanism provides an additional channel causing stressed
but solvent banks to default.
2 Cascade Mechanisms
The assumptions we now make lead to a stylized network model admitting double
cascades of illiquidity and insolvency that can be computed efficiently under a wide
range of initial conditions. The picture to adopt is that of a system hit “out of
the blue” by a large shock that triggers a systemic crisis that proceeds stepwise in
time. Many realistic effects that would significantly complicate our model are left
out. For example, banks respond mechanistically according to simple stylized rules
rather than dynamically optimizing their behaviour. We rule out other channels
of systemic risk, in particular asset fire sales. We take a static view, and ignore
external cash flows, interest payments and price changes for the duration of the
cascade. We make an assumption of zero-recovery on interbank assets on the default
of a counterparty during the cascade. Our assumptions imply that insolvency (that
is, when equity is nonpositive) is equivalent to default (that is, the bank can no
longer pay some liability). This means that even when stressed, banks always pay
recalled interbank liabilities in full, until the moment they become insolvent.
The network consists of a collection of N banks, labelled by numbers from the
set N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, each structured with a balance sheet as shown in Figure 2.
The subset of debtor banks of a bank v ∈ N is called the in-neighbourhood of v,
denoted by N−v , and the in-degree is the number of debtors jv = |N−v | . Similarly
the bank’s creditor banks form a subset called the out-neighbourhood N+v of v
whose size kv = |N+v | is called the out-degree. The web of interbank counterparties
is called the “skeleton”, and is identifiable as a directed graph, i.e. a collection of
directed arrows, called edges, between pairs of nodes. Each debtor-creditor pair
v, w with w ∈ N+v is denoted by an edge ` = (vw) pointing from v to w.b The
bThe convention that arrows point from debtors to creditors means that default shocks prop-
agate in the downstream direction. Confusingly, much of the systemic risk literature uses the
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Figure 2: The stylized balance sheet of a bank v with in-degree jv = 3
and out-degree kv = 2. Banks w1, w2, w3 are debtors of v while w
′
1, w
′
2
are its creditors. The total exposure of v to w1 is denoted with Ωw1v, and
so on. The default buffer ∆ of bank v is the difference between assets
and liabilities, and the “stress buffer” Σ is the preferred asset class from
which it pays creditors’ demands.
type (j, k) of a bank v is its in-degree j = jv and out-degree k = kv, and we write
v ∈ Njk. The type (k, j) = (k`, j`) of an edge ` = (vw) is the out-degree k` = kv of
the debtor bank v and the in-degree j` = jw of the creditor bank w, and we write
` ∈ Ekj .
The bank equity or net worth ∆v = max(A
F
v +A
IB
v +A
L
v −LDv −LIBv , 0) of bank
v incorporates limited liability, which assumes that the bank must default and be
forced to liquidate at the first moment it becomes insolvent, that is, its liabilities
exceed its assets. Thus ∆v can be interpreted as the bank’s default buffer that must
always be kept positive to avoid default.
Banks are also concerned about the possibility of runs on their liabilities, and try
to keep a positive buffer of liquid assets AL (such as cash and government bonds),
henceforth called the stress buffer Σ, which are the preferred asset class from which
to pay creditors’ demands. A bank v with Σv fully depleted to zero will be called
stressed. This does not mean the bank is illiquid in the sense of being unable to
meet the creditors’ demands. Rather it means that the bank is experiencing a
significant degree of stress in meeting these demands and must turn to other assets,
first interbank assets, then fixed assets, to realize the needed cash. The no fire sale
assumption means that as long as they are solvent, stressed banks always meet their
payment obligations.
The interbank liabilities LIB and assets AIB decompose into bilateral interbank
reverse convention that arrows point from creditors to debtors.
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exposures. For any bank v and one of its creditors w ∈ N+v , we denote by Ωvw the
total exposure of w to v. Then we have the constraints
AIBv =
∑
w∈N−v
Ωwv; L
IB
v =
∑
w∈N+v
Ωvw . (2.1)
Prior to the onset of the crisis, all banks are assumed to be in the normal
state. Then, on day n = 0, a collection of banks, possibly all banks, are assumed
to experience initial shocks. Two kinds of initial shocks are possible. First, an
asset shock causes a drop in the mark-to-market value of the fixed asset portfolio,
and reduces the default buffer. If the downward asset shock leads to ∆ ≤ 0, the
bank must default. The second kind of shock is a demand shock by the external
depositors that reduces the stress buffer. If the demand shock leads to Σ ≤ 0, the
bank becomes stressed.
Timing and Bank Behaviour Assumptions:c
1. Prior to the crisis, all banks are in the normal state, neither stressed nor
insolvent. The crisis commences on day 0 after initial shocks trigger the
default or stress of one or more banks;
2. Balance sheets are recomputed daily on a mark-to-market basis and banks
respond daily on the basis of their newly computed balance sheets. All ex-
ternal cash flows, interest payments, and asset and liability price changes are
ignored throughout the crisis.
3. An insolvent bank, characterized by ∆ = 0, is forced into liquidation by the
regulator. At this moment, each of its creditor banks are obliged to write
down its defaulted exposures to zero thereby experiencing a solvency shock
that reduces its default buffer ∆.
4. A stressed bank, defined to be a non-defaulted bank with Σ = 0, reacts one
time only, at the moment it becomes stressed, by reducing its interbank assets
AIB to (1−λ)AIB where λ taken to be a fixed constant across all banks during
the crisis. It does so by recalling a fraction λ of its interbank loans, thereby
transmitting a stress shock to the liabilities each of its debtor banks. Since
nondefaulted banks are able to pay all of their liabilities, such recalled loans
are repaid in full.
5. A newly defaulted bank also triggers maximal stress shocks (i.e. with λ = 1)
to each of its debtor banks as its bankruptcy trustees recall all its interbank
loans, reducing AIB to 0;
6. Stress shocks reduce any bank’s stress buffer Σ and stressed banks remain
stressed until the end of the cascade or until they default.
cTreating cascade steps as daily is simply an aid to understanding.
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Remark 1. The stress parameter λ was introduced by Gai, Haldane & Kapadia
(2011) to simplify banks’ response to liquidity stress and to capture the effect of
liquidity hoarding. We suppose that banks react sufficiently strongly to stress by
choosing λ ∈ [0.4, 1], to capture the picture that they hoard liquidity to preempt
the need for further response later in the crisis. Unlike default, a bank is free to
set its response to liquidity: both λ and the size of the stress buffer Σ are its own
policy decisions. In a more realistic and complex model, λ would be endogenously
determined for each bank, reflecting the cumulative demands on its liabilities.
The dynamics of the cascade that follow from these assumptions is stock flow
consistent. This means that as long as both counterparties are solvent, every trans-
action involves four equal and opposite balance sheet adjustments: to both the
assets and liabilities of both counterparties. The dynamics also has the property
that it is completely determined by a reduced set of balance sheet data that consists
of the collection of buffers ∆,Σ and interbank exposures Ω.
We shall now apply the cascade rules to a financial network found on day 0 of
the crisis in an initial state described by the following elements: the interbank links
which form a directed graph E on the set of banks v ∈ N , called the skeleton; the
buffers ∆v,Σv for nodes v ∈ N ; and the exposures Ωvw for edges ` = (vw) ∈ E .
After n cascade steps, we identify Dn, the set of defaulted banks, Sn, the set of
undefaulted banks that are under stress after n steps, andDcn∩Scn which contains the
remaining undefaulted, unstressed banks.d In our model, banks do not recover from
either default or stress during the crisis, so the sequences {Dn}n∈N and {Dn∪Sn}n∈N
are non-decreasing.
To say that a bank v is defaulted at step n means that default shocks to step
n− 1 exceed its default buffer:
Dn :=

{∆v = 0} for n = 0
{
v | ∑w∈N−v Ωwvξ(n−1)wv ≥ ∆v} for n ≥ 1 ,
(2.2)
where the variables ξ indicate the fractional sizes of the various default shocks
impacting v. Similarly, for any upstream neighbour w ∈ N−v , we say that v is
defaulted at step n without regarding w and write v ∈ Dn 6r w under the conditions
Dn 6r w :=

{∆v = 0} ∩ N+w for n = 0{
v ∈ N+w |
∑
v′∈N−v \w Ωv′vξ
(n−1)
v′v ≥ ∆v
}
for n ≥ 1 .
(2.3)
Finally, to say v is stressed at step n means both that it is not yet defaulted and
dFor any set B, Bc denotes its complement. For an event defined by some condition P , for
example v ∈ Dn, the indicator function for that event is written 1(P ).
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the stress shocks to step n− 1 exceed the stress buffer, i.e. Sn = Dcn ∩ Sˆn where
Sˆn :=

{Σv = 0} for n = 0
{
v | ∑w∈N+v Ωvwζ(n−1)vw ≥ Σv} for n ≥ 1 ,
(2.4)
where the variables ζ indicate the fractional sizes of the stress shocks impacting v.
Accounting for the fact that at the moment when v becomes stressed it reduces
its interbank exposures, one can see that for n ≥ 1 the fractions ξ(n) are given
recursively by
ξ(n)wv :=

ξ
(n−1)
wv when w ∈ Dn−1 ∪ Dcn
1 when w ∈ Dn \ Dn−1 and v ∈ Sˆcn−1
1− λ when w ∈ Dn \ Dn−1 and v ∈ Sˆn−1 ,
(2.5)
with the initial values ξ
(0)
wv = 1(w ∈ D0). Similarly, accounting for the assumption
that defaulted creditors transmit a maximal stress impact, whereas stressed credi-
tors only transmit a stress shock of a fraction λ of the interbank exposure, one has
for n ≥ 0
ζ(n)vw :=

0 when w ∈ Sˆcn ∩ (Dcn 6r v)
λ when w ∈ Sˆn ∩ (Dcn 6r v)
1 when w ∈ Dn 6r v .
(2.6)
The reader will be curious to see the 6r condition in (2.6). The rationale is
that the 6r condition explicitly eliminates an apparent feedback where the stress
shock to v from w at step n seems to depend on the default state of v at step n− 2.
This feedback is apparent, not real, because any stress shock to a defaulted bank is
inconsequential.
The above prescription completely characterizes the cascade mapping of the
system to itself. This mapping arrives at the fixed point that represents the end of
the crisis in at most 2N steps when acting on a network of N banks. The next two
sections are devoted to the derivation of two probabilistic versions of this double
cascade mapping: first for the case of networks with random skeletons, and second
for the case of networks with random balance sheets on a fixed skeleton.
3 Networks with Random Skeletons
Our model of a random financial network has three layers of structure: the skeleton
(a random directed graph (N , E)); the buffer random variables ∆v,Σv, v ∈ N
and the random exposures Ω`, ` ∈ E . We give a complete specification of the
distributional properties of these random variables.
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The skeleton (N , E) is a random directed assortative configuration graph (ACG)
of the type studied by Hurd (2016), generalizing the well-known undirected config-
uration random graph model introduced in Bender & Canfield (1978) and Bolloba´s
(1980). The model is parametrized by N and the node and edge type distributions
Pjk = P[v ∈ Njk], Qkj = P[` ∈ Ekj ], j, k ≤ K (3.1)
where for simplicity in the following we assume in and out degrees j, k are bounded
by a constant K. P and Q can be considered as bivariate distributions which have
marginals:
P+k :=
∑
j
Pjk, P
−
j :=
∑
k
Pjk, Q
+
k :=
∑
j
Qkj , Q
−
j :=
∑
k
Qkj . (3.2)
Assortativity is defined to be the Pearson correlation of Q, considered as a bivariate
probability distribution. Several studies of real financial networks, notably Bech &
Atalay (2010), highlight the fact and relevance of their observed negative assorta-
tivity.
Definition 1 (The ACG Construction). The node and edge type probability laws
P,Q are consistent if:
z :=
∑
j
jP−j =
∑
k
kP+k ,
Q+k = kP
+
k /z, Q
−
j = jP
−
j /z, for all j, k ≤ K. (3.3)
Given consistent data N,P,Q, a random graph (N , E) with N nodes is sampled as
follows:
1. Draw a sequence of N node-type pairs X = ((j1, k1), . . . , (jN , kN )) inde-
pendently from P , and accept the draw if and only if it is feasible, i.e.∑
v∈N jv =
∑
v∈N kv, and this defines the number of edges E that will
result. Label the vth node with kv out-stubs (each out-stub is a half-edge
with an out-arrow, labelled by its degree kv) and jv in-stubs, labelled by their
degree jv. Define the partial sums
u−j =
∑
v
1(jv = j), u
+
k =
∑
v
1(kv = k), ujk =
∑
v
1(jv = j, kv = k),
(3.4)
the number e+k = ku
+
k of k-stubs (out-stubs of degree k) and the number of
j-stubs (in-stubs of degree j), e−j = ju
−
j .
2. Conditioned on X, the result of Step 1, choose an arbitrary ordering `− and
`+ of the E in-stubs and E out-stubs. The matching sequence, or “wiring”,
W of edges is selected by choosing a pair of permutations σ, σ˜ ∈ S(E) of the
set E . This determines the edge sequence ` = (`− = σ(`), `+ = σ˜(`)) labelled
by ` ∈ E , to which is attached a probability weighting factor∏
`∈E
Qkσ(`)jσ˜(`) . (3.5)
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The ACG simulation algorithm defines the required class of random graphs,
but is infeasible because the acceptance condition in Step 1 is achieved only rarely,
and drawing random permutations as in Step 2 is impractical. The paper Hurd
(2016) proposes an approximate simulation algorithm that appears to work well in
practice.
The non-negative default buffer random variables ∆v, v ∈ N have point masses
at x = 0 that represent the bank initial default probability p0v. We assume that the
distribution functions of ∆v depend only on the type (j, k), and have the following
form:
Djk(x) = P[∆v ≤ x | v ∈ Njk] ; d
dx
Djk(x) := p
0
jkδ0(x) + djk(x) . (3.6)
where djk(x) ≥ 0 is a specified function with
∫∞
0
djk(x)dx = 1− p0jk. Similarly, the
stress buffer Σv has a point mass at x = 0 that represents this bank’s initial stress
probability q0v and a distribution function that depends only on its node type (j, k).
Thus the stress buffer distribution functions of nodes v ∈ Njk have the following
form:
Sjk(x) = P[Σv ≤ x, v /∈ D0 | v ∈ Njk] ; d
dx
Sjk(x) := q
0
jkδ0(x) + sjk(x) . (3.7)
where sjk(x) ≥ 0 is a specified function with
∫∞
0
sjk(x)dx = 1 − p0jk − q0jk. The
exposure random variables Ω`, ` ∈ E are positive (i.e. there is zero probability to
have a zero weight) and have distributions that depend only on the edge type (k, j).
These can be specified by the distribution functions
Wkj(x) = P[Ω` ≤ x | ` ∈ Ekj ]; d
dx
Wkj(x) = wkj(x) . (3.8)
Finally, conditional on the random skeleton (N , E), the collection of random vari-
ables {∆v,Σv,Ω`} is assumed to be mutually independent.
It was proven in Hurd (2016) that the probability measure on random networks
just defined has a property called locally tree-like independence (LTI) extending
the well-known locally tree-like property of configuration graphs that cycles of any
fixed finite length occur with an asymptotically zero density as the number of nodes
N goes to infinity for fixed P,Q. The probabilistic analysis to follow rests on this
extended type of independence that holds as N →∞:
The locally tree-like independence (LTI) property: Consider the double
cascade model defined by the collection of random variables (N , E ,∆,Σ,Ω). Let
N1,N2 ⊂ N be any two subsets that share exactly one node N1 ∩N2 = {v} and let
X1, X2 be any pair of random variables where for each i = 1, 2, Xi is determined by
the information on Ni. Then X1 and X2 are conditionally independent, conditioned
on the information ∆v,Σv, jv, kv located at the node v.
The cascade mapping we now propose is based on the observation that a proba-
bility such as P[v ∈ Dn] that depends on the nth order neighbourhood of the node
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v can be approximated iteratively, in terms of the probabilities of the states of the
first order neighbouring nodes and edges of v at step n− 1. The accuracy of such a
scheme depends on the degree of dependence between the states of these first order
neighbours of v. In ideal situations, there is no dependence at all, and the cascade
mapping is exact. In our present model, there are two sources of residual depen-
dence amongst these neighbours, and our approximation amounts to neglecting this
residual dependence.
Let us define
p
(n)
jk = P [v ∈ Dn | v ∈ Njk] ,
q
(n)
jk = P [v ∈ Sn | v ∈ Njk] ,
p˜
(n)
jk = P
[
v ∈ Dn 6r w | v ∈ Njk ∩N+w
]
,
q̂
(n)
jk = P
[
v ∈ Sˆn | v ∈ Njk
]
.
(3.9)
where p
(n)
jk is the probability that a (j, k)-node has defaulted by time n, q
(n)
jk is the
probability that a (j, k)-node is stressed at time n, p˜
(n)
jk is the probability that a
(j, k)-node has defaulted by time n, without regarding of one of its in-neighbours,
and q̂
(n)
jk is the probability that a (j, k)-node satisfies the stress condition (2.4) at
time n. Our aim is to compute p
(n)
jk , q̂
(n)
jk , p˜
(n)
jk , plus an auxiliary quantity
t
(n)
kj = P
[
ξ(n)wv = 1 | (w, v) ∈ Ekj
]
, (3.10)
recursively over n. It is also convenient to define
p
(n)
k = P[v ∈ Dn | kv = k] =
∑
j
p
(n)
jk Pj|k ,
p˜
(n)
j = P[v ∈ Dn 6r w | jv = j, v ∈ N+w ] =
∑
k
p˜
(n)
jk Pk|j , (3.11)
q̂
(n)
j = P[v ∈ Sˆn | jv = j] =
∑
k
q̂
(n)
jk Pk|j ,
where Pj|k :=
Pjk
P+k
, Pk|j :=
Pjk
P−j
.
Our computations will rely on two facts. The first is that if X,Y are two
independent random variables with probability density functions (PDFs) fX(x) =
F ′X(x), fY (y) = F
′
Y (y), then
P [X ≥ Y ] = E [1(X ≥ Y )] =
∫
R
∫
R
1(X ≥ Y )fX(x)fY (y) dxdy
=
∫
R
FY (x)fX(x) dx =
〈
FY , fX
〉
.
(3.12)
In general, the Hermitian inner product on R is defined as 〈f, g〉 = ∫∞−∞f¯(x)g(x) dx,
but here, both operands are real functions and the conjugate operator disappears.
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A second fact is that if X1, X2, · · · , Xn are n independent random variables with
PDFs fXi , then the PDF of the sum X = X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xn is the convolution
fX = fX1 ~ fX2 ~ · · ·~ fXn = ~nk=1fXk , (3.13)
where the convolution product of two functions is the function defined by (f ~
g)(x) =
∫
R f(y)g(x− y)dy. For convolution powers, we write ~nk=1fX = f ~nX .
The following cascade mapping provides a closed set of recursive formulas for
n ≥ 1 starting with p(0)jk = p˜(0)jk , q̂(0)jk , t(0)kj = p(0)k determined by the initial shock and
stress probabilities.
Cascade Mapping: For any n ≥ 1, suppose p(n−1)jk , q̂(n−1)jk , p˜(n−1)jk , t(n−1)kj are
known. The cascade mapping gives the quantities p
(n)
jk , q̂
(n)
jk , p˜
(n)
jk , t
(n)
jk recursively by
p
(n)
jk =
〈
Djk,
(
g
(n−1)
j
)~j〉
, (3.14)
p˜
(n)
jk =
〈
Djk,
(
g
(n−1)
j
)~j−1〉
, (3.15)
q̂
(n)
jk =
〈
Sjk,
(
h
(n−1)
k
)~k〉
, (3.16)
t
(n)
kj = t
(n−1)
kj + (p
(n)
k − p(n−1)k )(1− q̂(n−1)j ) , (3.17)
where Djk and Sjk are defined in (3.6) and (3.7), respectively, and we use (3.11)
to compute p
(n−1)
k′ , q̂
(n−1)
j′ , p˜
(n−1)
j′ . Moreover, the stress probabilities q
(n)
jk are deter-
mined by
1− q(n)jk − p(n)jk = P[v ∈ Sˆcn ∩ Dcn | v ∈ Njk]
=
(
1− q̂(n)jk
)(
1−
〈
Djk,
(
g˜
(n−1)
j
)~j〉)
. (3.18)
The probability distribution functions in these formulas are also computed recur-
sively:
g
(n−1)
j (x) =
∑
k′
[
(1− p(n−1)k′ )δ0(x) + t(n−1)k′j wk′j(x)
+(p
(n−1)
k′ − t(n−1)k′j ) ·
1
1− λwk′j(x/(1− λ))
]
·Qk′|j , (3.19)
h
(n−1)
k (x) =
∑
j′
[
(1− q̂(n−1)j′ )(1− p˜(n−1)j′ ))δ0(x) + p˜(n−1)j′ wkj′(x)
+q̂
(n−1)
j′ (1− p˜(n−1)j′ ) ·
1
λ
wkj′(x/λ)
]
·Qj′|k , (3.20)
g˜
(n−1)
j (x) =
∑
k′
[
(1− p(n−1)k′ )δ0(x) + p(n−1)k′ wk′j(x)
]
·Qk′|j (3.21)
with Qk|j =
Qkj
Q−j
, Qj|k =
Qkj
Q+k
.
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Justification: To justify (3.14) we need to suppose that the collection of random
variables Ωwvξ
(n−1)
wv for different w ∈ N−v are mutually conditionally independent.
However, there are two sources of dependence: the first is the usual breaking of the
LTI property for finite N due to cycles in the skeleton, the second, specific to this
model, is the dependence on whether v is in Sn−1. Our approximation is to neglect
both sources of dependence, allowing the use of (3.12) to give
p
(n)
jk = P[∆v ≤
∑
w∈N−v
Ωwvξ
(n−1)
wv | v ∈ Njk]
=
〈
Djk,
(
g
(n−1)
j
)~j〉
. (3.22)
where
g
(n−1)
j (x) =
∑
k′
Qk′|j
d
dx
P[Ωwvξ(n−1)wv ≤ x | v ∈ Njk, w ∈ N−v , kw = k′] . (3.23)
Under the conditions v ∈ Njk, w ∈ N−v , kw = k′, the events
{ξ(n−1)wv = 0}, {ξ(n−1)wv = 1},{ξ(n−1)wv = 1− λ} have conditional probabilities
1−p(n−1)k′ , t(n−1)k′j , (p(n−1)k′ −t(n−1)k′j ) respectively and the three events are conditionally
independent of Ωwv assuming the LTI property. These facts lead to (3.19).
To verify (3.15), we use (2.3) instead of (2.2) and follow these same steps. To
verify (3.16), we use (2.4), (3.9) and (3.12) to give the formula
q̂
(n)
jk = P[Σv ≤
∑
w∈N+v
Ωvw ζˆ
(n)
vw | v ∈ Njk] =
〈
Sjk,
(
h
(n−1)
k (x)
)~k〉
(3.24)
where
h
(n−1)
k (x) =
∑
j′
d
dx
P[Ωvw ζˆ(n−1)vw ≤ x | v ∈ Njk, w ∈ N+v , jw = j′] Qj′|k . (3.25)
To verify (3.20), note that under the conditions kv = k,w ∈ N+v , jw = j′, the events
{ζˆ(n−1)vw = 0}, {ζˆ(n−1)vw = 1}, {ζˆ(n−1)vw = λ} are equivalent to the events
{w ∈ Sˆcn−1∩Dcn−1 6r v}, {w ∈ Dn−1 6r v}, {w ∈ Sn−1} and hence have conditional
probabilities (1 − q̂(n−1)j′ )(1 − p˜(n−1)j′ ), p˜(n−1)j′ , q̂(n−1)j′ (1 − p˜(n−1)j′ ) respectively. To
verify (3.17), we apply the LTI property again to compute the conditional proba-
bility of the disjoint union {ξ(n)wv = 1} = {ξ(n−1)wv = 1} ∪ {w ∈ Dn ∩Dcn−1, v ∈ Sˆcn−1}
defined by (2.5).
Finally, to verify (3.18), we note that Sˆcn∩Dcn = Sˆcn∩{∆v >
∑
w∈N−v Ωwv1{w∈Dn−1}}.
By LTI, these last two events are independent conditioned on v ∈ Njk, and the re-
quired formula results by following the steps taken to prove (3.14).
Remark 2. We see from this argument that the cascade mapping has two sources
of error. The first, stemming from cycles in the skeleton that cause finite size
corrections to the LTI property, is familiar, and known to behave like O(N−1) on
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configuration graphs as the network size N grows to infinity, and to be zero on finite
tree graphs. The second source of error is less familiar and stems from dependence
due to the assumption that the default shocks that impact v are diminished by a
factor 1−λ when v becomes stressed, that is, they depend on whether v is stressed
or not.
The iterates of this cascade mapping converge as n→∞ to a fixed set of prob-
abilities that represent the eventual state of the system at the end of the cascade.
These final probabilities can be used to measure the overall impact of the crisis.
For example, the expected number of eventually defaulted and stressed banks are
Expected number of defaulted banks = N
∑
jk
Pjk p
(∞)
jk = N
∑
k
P+k p
(∞)
k (3.26)
Expected number of stressed banks = N
∑
jk
Pjk q
(∞)
jk . (3.27)
4 Networks with Fixed Skeletons
The goal of the present section is to derive approximate probabilistic formulas de-
scribing the double cascade on a network where the skeleton is actually known
(deterministic) and finite, while the buffers and weights are random. This analysis
will allow us to address systemic risk in tractable models of real observed financial
networks, without the need for Monte Carlo simulations.
Let A = Avv′ , v, v
′ ∈ N be the nonsymmetric adjacency matrix of the fixed
directed graph (N , E). We number the nodes in N by v = 1, 2, . . . , N and the
links by ` = 1, 2, . . . , E where E =
∑
1≤v,v′≤N Avv′ . The buffer random variables
∆v,Σv at each node are assumed to have a mass p
(0)
v , q
(0)
v at 0 (representing the
initial default and stress probabilities) and continuous support with density func-
tions d(x), sv(x) on the positive reals. The edge weights Ω`, ` ∈ E have continuous
support with densities w`(x) on the positive reals but no mass at 0. The random
variables {∆v,Σv,Ω`}, v ∈ N , ` ∈ E are assumed to be an independent collection.
The aim of this section is to use the LTI property as an approximation to
derive formulas for the marginal likelihoods p
(∞)
v , q
(∞)
v for the eventual default and
stress of all individual nodes, as well as the possibility to compute formulas for
more detailed systemic quantities. This approximation is not exact for the same
two reasons as before: there is dependence between the default shocks hitting a
bank v due to the stress response, and when there are cycles in the skeleton. In
general, when the skeleton is a single random realization from a configuration graph
ensemble, we expect the LTI approximation to get better with increasingN . We now
present an approximate analysis, paralleling the previous section, of the sequence
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of probabilities
p(n)v = P[v ∈ Dn] ,
q(n)v = P[v ∈ Sn] ,
p˜(n)wv = P[v ∈ Dn 6r w] ,
q̂(n)v = P[v ∈ Sˆn] ,
(4.1)
for each node v or edge wv. For the same reason as before we need in addition to
track
t(n)wv = P
[
ξ(n)wv = 1 | v ∈ N+w
]
. (4.2)
Inductively, we have
p(n)v =
〈
Dv,~v′∈N−v
(
g
(n−1)
v′v
)〉
, (4.3)
p˜(n)wv =
〈
Dv,~v′∈N−v \w
(
g
(n−1)
v′v
)〉
, (4.4)
q̂(n)v =
〈
Sv,~v′∈N+v
(
h
(n−1)
vv′
)〉
, (4.5)
t(n)wv = t
(n−1)
wv + (p
(n)
w − p(n−1)w )(1− q̂(n−1)v ) , (4.6)
q(n)v = 1− p(n)v −
(
1− q̂(n)v
)〈
Dv,~v′∈N−v
(
g˜
(n−1)
v′v
)〉
. (4.7)
The PDFs can be computed as before under the LTI approximation:
g(n−1)wv (x) = (1− p(n−1)w )δ0(x) + t(n−1)wv wwv(x)
+ (p(n−1)w − t(n−1)wv ) ·
1
1− λwwv(x/1− λ) , (4.8)
h(n−1)vw (x) = (1− q̂(n−1)w )(1− p˜(n−1)vw )δ0(x) + p˜(n−1)vw wvw(x)
+q̂(n−1)w (1− p˜(n−1)vw ) ·
1
λ
wvw(x/λ) , (4.9)
g˜(n−1)wv (x) = (1− p(n−1)w )δ0(x) + p(n−1)wv wwv(x) . (4.10)
5 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we report briefly on numerical experiments that illustrate the meth-
ods developed in this paper. Firstly, we aim to convince the reader that the LTI
method correctly computes the fixed point of the double cascade mapping in net-
works with large values of N by cross validating it using an independently coded
Monte Carlo (MC) implementation. For efficiency, the LTI implementation uses a
Fast Fourier Transform approach to compute the convolutions in (3.14)-(3.17). This
technique was developed in Hurd & Gleeson (2013) and is sketched in Appendix
A. Secondly, we will show how the LTI method can lead to answers to questions
about the nature of systemic risk, particularly the intertwining of stress and default.
Thirdly, we shall show how the method performs in a challenging stylized network
specified to reflect the complex characteristics of a 2011 dataset on the network of
90 most systemically important banks in the European Union.
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5.1 Experiment 1: Verifying the LTI Method
This experiment aims to verify that the LTI method performs as expected when
applied to a stylized financial network whose specification is similar to that given
in Gai & Kapadia (2010a). It consists of a random directed Poisson skeleton with
N = 20000 nodes and mean degree z = 10, where each node v can be viewed as
a bank with a default buffer ∆v = 0.04 and stress buffer Σv = 0.035. Unlike the
deterministic interbank exposures used in Gai & Kapadia (2010a), the weight Ω`
of an edge ` is taken from a log-normal distribution with mean µ` = 0.2j
−1
` , and
standard deviation 0.383µ`. Note that this specification makes the exposure size
dependent on the lending bank. An initial shock is applied to the network that
causes each bank to default with a 1% probability.
We compare the final fractions of defaulted and stressed banks as computed
using MC simulation with 1000 realizations and the LTI analytic formulas in (3.26)
and (3.27). It is simple to generate a directed Poisson random graph of size N
with mean degree z > 0: one simply selects directed edges independently from all
N(N − 1) potential edges, each with probability p = z/(N − 1). The resultant bi-
degree distribution is a product of binomials, Pjk = P[v ∈ Njk] = Bin(N −1, p, j)×
Bin(N − 1, p, k), which for large N nodes is approximately a product of Poisson(z)
distributions.
Figure 3 plots the results as functions of the stress response parameter λ, with
error bars that represent the 10th and 90th percentile of the MC result. It shows the
expected agreement between MC and LTI analytics, with discrepancies that can be
attributed to finite N effects present in the MC simulations.
One fundamental property of our model is clearly shown in this experiment:
stress and default are negatively correlated. This fact can be explained by the
stress response which enables banks to react to liquidity shocks before they default,
by reducing their interbank exposures. This response creates yet more stress, but
leads to a more resilient network. The “knife-edge” property of default cascades is
also clearly shown: In the model parametrization we chose, a very small increase in
λ dramatically alters the stability of the network. We also note that MC error bars
are very large near the knife-edge.
5.2 Experiment 2: A Stylized Poisson Network
The next experiment focuses again on Poisson networks, with the aim to better
understand the effects of various parameters on network resilience. In general, we
continue to find confirmation that the LTI results accurately reflect observations
from MC simulations.
5.2.1 Experiment 2A: Effects of Default and Stress Buffers
We consider how the parametrized financial network of Experiment 1 in a default-
susceptible state with λ = 0.5 can be made resilient to random shocks by either
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Figure 3: Experiment 1. The mean default and stress cascade sizes
computed by MC simulations (symbols) and LTI analytics (lines). The
skeleton is a Poisson directed network with N = 20000 nodes and mean
degree z = 10. All banks have default buffers ∆v = 0.04 and stress
buffers Σv = 0.035. An edge weight Ω` of an edge ` is taken from a
log-normal distribution with mean µ` = 0.2j
−1
` and standard deviation
0.383µ`. Error bars indicate the 10
th and 90th percentiles of the MC
result.
increasing the default buffers or decreasing the stress buffers. Such changes, for
example, can be prompted by financial regulators.
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Figure 4: Experiment 2A. The mean default cascade size as a function of
(a) default buffer ∆ and (b) stress buffer Σ. The LTI analytic approxi-
mation (lines) correctly predicts MC simulations results (symbols). Here
λ = 0.5 and other parameters are chosen as in Experiment 1 (Fig. 3).
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In Fig. 4(a) we illustrate how the change in default buffers affects the default
cascade size. We observe a very fast transition from 100% default cascade to almost
no default as ∆ increases over the interval [0.04, 0.045]. This knife-edge property is
observable in both the LTI analytics and in the MC simulations. Note again that
the MC error bars, representing the 10th and 90th percentiles, become very large
near the knife-edge.
In Fig. 4(b), we examine the influence of the stress buffer on the default cascade
size. If stress buffers are reduced, banks start to react to stress shocks more quickly,
which can in turn dramatically reduce default cascade risk in the network. Fig-
ures 4(a) and (b) show that there may be several approaches to improving network
resilience.
5.2.2 Experiment 2B: Effects of Graph Connectivity and Stress Response
Aside from mandating changes to the behaviour of banks during or prior to a crisis
by imposing constraints on stress and default buffers, regulators can also influence
the shape of the financial network as a whole. In Experiment 2B, we demonstrate
how systemic risk is influenced by the skeleton itself. To this end, we calculate
the sizes of default and stress cascades in a directed Poisson network as a function
of the connectivity parameter z and the stress response λ. In our simple model
specification, the mean degree z is the only parameter that controls the shape of
the skeleton, whereas in a more realistic modelling approach the skeleton may have
many more parameters.
In this experiment, we increased the model complexity by assuming each bank
has a random default buffer taken from a log-normal distribution with mean 0.18
and standard deviation 0.18, and a stress buffer from an independent log-normal
distribution with mean 0.12 and standard deviation 0.12. The edge weights Ω` come
from a log-normal distribution with mean and standard deviation proportional to
(j`k`)
−0.5, with the average edge weight on the entire network equal to 1. Once
again we apply an initial shock so that each bank has 1% chance of defaulting
initially.
In Figs. 5(a) and (b), we respectively show the mean sizes of default and stress
cascades as functions of network mean degree z and the stress response λ. For
clarity of the graphics, we do not show the MC simulations, as they agree, in a
similar fashion as earlier, with the LTI analytics . Again, in these plots we notice
the strong anti-correlation between stress and default probabilities as we vary z and
λ. It is also interesting to observe that the final level of stress is not monotonic in
the connectivity parameter z.
5.3 Experiment 3: An EU-Inspired Network with 90 Nodes
It is well known that Poisson random graphs are an inadequate description of real
economic networks, so we are interested in having a rough picture of the systemic
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Figure 5: Experiment 2B. The sizes of the mean default cascade (a) and
the mean stress cascade (b) on a directed Poisson network as functions
of the network mean degree z and stress response parameter λ. Here the
values of edge weights (interbank exposures), default and stress buffers
are taken from log-normal distributions as specified in the text. Other
parameters are the same as in Fig. 3.
risk of actual financial networks. In Experiment 3, we consider a single realization
of a 90 node graph that aims to capture stylized features of the interbank network
of the European Union. We computed cascade dynamics on this network using both
the MC simulations and the LTI analytic method of Section 4 for networks with a
fixed skeleton. As a preliminary step (not reported), we validated the consistency of
the LTI analysis by verifying that the two methods agree as expected on a number
of tree networks.
Numerous studies of real-world financial networks, notably Bech & Atalay (2010)
and Cont, Moussa & Santos (2013), have observed their highly heterogeneous struc-
ture and concluded that in and out degrees have fat tailed distributions, as do
exposure sizes, and presumably, buffers. Our schematic model of 90 EU banks
was designed to capture these basic statistical features, and as well to fit aggre-
gated statistics from data published on the 2011 ECB stress testing of systemically
important banks in the European Union. We show the skeleton of our stylized net-
work in Figure 6. The details of its construction and the specifications for buffer
and exposure distributions are given in Appendix B.
In the first part of the experiment, we calculate the mean sizes of stress and
default cascades that start from the default of one random bank in the EU network.
Figure 7(a) shows the mean default and stress cascade sizes as functions of the
stress response parameter λ. This graph shows no evidence of cascading (beyond
the initially defaulted bank and the stress it causes to its immediate neighbors),
demonstrating that the MC and analytic computations agree that the EU network
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Figure 6: A representation of the skeleton of the 90 bank network of
Experiment 3. We do not show the edge directions here to avoid clut-
tering the figure. The nodes are plotted with total degree increasing in
the clockwise direction, with the minimally connected bank being the
rightmost node.
in June 2011 was resilient to such a shock.
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Figure 7: Experiment 3: sizes of default and stress cascades on a stylized
EU interbank network starting from the default of a single randomly
chosen bank. (a) Cascade sizes for various values of the stress response
λ. The EU financial system at the time of the 2011 stress testing exercise
appears to be resilient to single-bank shocks. (b) The same system as in
(a) where a dire pre-shock crisis has reduced the bank default buffers to
10% of their original value, and stress buffers to a fraction of their value
indicated on the x-axis.
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To move the EU network to a knife-edge situation where a large scale double
cascade can be triggered by the default of a single bank, we found it was necessary
to imagine a dire crisis where prior to the default shock, the Core Tier 1 Capital of
all institutions (i.e. their default buffers) has been decimated to 10% of their initial
amount. Furthermore, each bank’s stress buffer is also reduced to a certain fraction
of its original value. In Fig. 7(b) we take λ = 0.7 and show the cascade sizes versus
the remaining fraction of stress buffers.
The MC simulations show that for smaller shocks the size of a stress cascade first
dominate default cascades: the banking system becomes highly illiquid, but most
banks are able to protect themselves from default. Beyond a certain critical value
of the global shock, however, default cascades take over stress cascades, as banks
are hit by a shock so high that they default immediately, without the possibility
to protect themselves as they would if they got first in the stressed state. Our
analytical approach is able to capture the essence of these mechanisms, identifying
correctly the critical point where default cascades overtake stress cascades. The
quantitative size of the cascades away from this critical point, however, is less well
matched by the analytical model, probably because of the presence of short cycles in
the skeleton. As cycles tend to slow down the cascades, the transitions are smoother
in the MC. It is quite interesting that, in spite of our two approximations, our model
is able to capture the general mechanisms: a peak in the number of stressed banks
is a signal that can indicate quite precisely the point where systemic default takes
over in a banking network.
6 Conclusions
Our double cascade model is a natural extension of a strand of systemic risk research
that studies elementary models that build in either default or stress cascades, but
not both. Only by combining the default and stress mechanisms into a single model
can one measure such features as the intuitively obvious effect of banks using the
stress response to reduce their risk of default.
Developing a feasible and reliable computation framework for a model as com-
plex as ours poses challenges that have been met in the experiments described in
Section 5. We have demonstrated how computations can be done by two comple-
mentary approaches: the Monte Carlo (MC) method and the locally tree-like inde-
pendence (LTI) analytic method. Having these two approaches, each with its pros
and cons, allows cross validation, increasing confidence in the results one obtains.
MC simulation, with its natural flexibility, remains the workhorse computational
framework for general systemic network risk. However, where it applies, the LTI
method, given its relation to similar methods in other areas of network science, adds
the possibility to understand the flow of the cascade in a different and sometimes
better way than one can with MC simulations alone. For example, using LTI one
can determine sensitivities to changing parameters through explicit differentiation.
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In some situations, for example in simulating general assortative (P,Q) configura-
tion models, the MC method is infeasible or leads to unacceptably long run times,
whereas the LTI method can be computed without difficulty. Ultimately what is
important is that both methods have complementary strengths and weaknesses,
and when used in combination lead to robust and reliable conclusions about a wide
range of network effects.
Our numerical experiments explore only a small sample of simple model spec-
ifications, leaving many promising financial networks to be investigated using our
techniques. While the systemic importance of parameters such as network connec-
tivity, mean buffer strength, and the size of the interbank sector have been studied
previously, other parameters such as the stress response, the buffer and exposure
variances, and graph assortativity, remain almost completely unexplored. The effect
of market illiquidity and asset fire sales has been omitted from the present paper,
but its impact on the cascade and consequently the greater economy merits careful
investigation. Financial network databases, and the statistical methods for match-
ing such data to the model, are still in an underdeveloped state, but are needed to
tie down the wide range of parameters in our model. Planned future investigations
of the double cascade model and its extensions will uncover and explain further in-
teresting and unexpected systemic risk phenomena, and find uses by policy makers
and regulators.
Appendix A Discrete Probability Distributions and the Fast Fourier
Transform
Numerical implementation of these models follows the methods outlined in Hurd
& Gleeson (2013). In this section, we analyze the case where all random variables
{∆v,Σv,Ω`} take values in a specific finite discrete set M = {0, 1, . . . , (M − 1)}
with a large value M . It is well known that in this situation the convolutions in
(3.13) are slow to compute by direct integration, but can be performed exactly and
efficiently by use of the discrete Fast Fourier Transform (FFT).
Let X,Y be two independent random variables with probability mass functions
(PMF) pX , pY taking values on the non-negative integers {0, 1, 2, . . . }. Then the
random variable X + Y also takes values on this set and has the probability mass
function (PMF) pX+Y = pX ∗ pY where the convolution of two functions f, g is
defined to be
(f ∗ g)(n) =
n∑
m=0
f(m)g(n−m) . (A.1)
Note that pX+Y will not necessarily have support on the finite setM if pX , pY have
support on M. This discrepancy leads to the difficulty called “aliasing”.
We now consider the space CM of C-valued functions on M = {0, 1, . . . ,M −
1}. The discrete Fourier transform, or fast Fourier transform (FFT), is the linear
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mapping F : a = [a0, . . . , aM−1] ∈ CM → aˆ = F(a) ∈ CM defined by
aˆk =
∑
l∈M
ζklal , k ∈M . (A.2)
where the coefficient matrix Z = (ζkl) has entries ζkl = e
−2piikl/M . The “inverse
FFT” (IFFT), is given by the map a→ a˜ = G(a) where
a˜k =
1
M
∑
l∈M
ζ¯klal , k ∈M . (A.3)
If we let a¯ denote the complex conjugate of a, we can define the Hermitian inner
product between
〈a, b〉 :=
∑
m∈M
a¯mbm . (A.4)
We also define the convolution product of two vectors:
(a ∗ b)(n) =
∑
m∈M
a(m) b(n−m modulo M), n ∈M . (A.5)
Note that this agrees with (A.1) if and only if the sum of the supports of a and
b is in M. Otherwise the difference is called an aliasing error: our numerical
implementations reduce or eliminate aliasing errors by taking M sufficiently large.
The following identities hold for all a, b ∈ CM :
1. Inverse mappings: a = G(F(a)) = F(G(a)) ;
2. Conjugation: G(a) = 1MF(a¯) ;
3. Parseval Identity: 〈a, b〉 = M〈a˜, b˜〉 = 1M 〈aˆ, bˆ〉 ;
4. Convolution Identities: a˜ ·∗b˜ = (˜a ∗ b), aˆ ·∗bˆ = (̂a ∗ b) ,
where ·∗ denotes the component-wise product.
As an example to illustrate how the above formulas help, we observe that a
typical formula (3.14) can be computed instead by the formula
p
(n)
jk =
1
M
〈F(D),
(
gˆ
(n−1)
j
)j
〉 , (A.6)
where Dˆ = F(D), gˆ(n−1)j = F(g(n−1)j ) and the power is the component-wise vector
multiplication. Such FFT-based formulas can be computed systematically, very
efficiently, if the discrete probability distributions for ∆,Σ,Ω are initialized in terms
of their Fourier transforms.
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Appendix B EU Network Construction
In 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) made public a datasete on the
interbank exposures of a selection of 90 medium to large European banks, as well
as other information such as their Core Tier 1 Capital and Risk Weighted Assets.
In this dataset, interbank exposures are aggregated by country on the liability side,
which means we only know the aggregated amount each bank v has lent to all banks
in each EU country c. In this Appendix we explain how we built the synthetic
network in Experiment 3 that mimics stylized facts of real financial networks and
uses this EBA data as a source of additional information about interbank liabilities
and bank balance sheets.
Motivated by the ubiquitous relevance of networks with fat-tailed degree dis-
tributions, as reported in papers such as Cont, Moussa & Santos (2013); Bech &
Atalay (2010), we built the skeleton based on the preferential attachment model of
Bolloba´s, Borgs, Chayes & Riordan (2003). Given four parameters α, γ, δ− and δ+
and letting β = 1−α−γ, this model grows a random directed network from a finite
initial “seed graph” using three rules:
1. With probability α, add a new vertex v together with an edge from v to
an existing vertex w, where w is chosen according to jw + δ− (that is, with
probability proportional to jw + δ−).
2. With probability β, add an edge from an existing vertex v, chosen according
to kv + δ+, to an existing vertex w, chosen according to jw + δ−.
3. With probability γ, add a new vertex v together with an edge from an existing
vertex w to v, where w is chosen according to kw + δ+.
This method is known to lead to fat-tailed degree distributions P−j ∼ j−τ− and
P+k ∼ k−τ+ with Pareto exponents τ− = 1 + 1+δ−(α+γ)α+β , τ+ = 1 + 1+δ+(α+γ)γ+β .
The four parameters α = 0.169, γ = 0.169, δ− = δ+ = 4.417 are determined by the
following conditions: we assumed Pareto exponents τ− = τ+ = 4 (ensuring finiteness
of certain moments), that α = γ, and that the mean degree is z = 10 (which is a
typical value observed in financial networks). To achieve this, we searched over a
range of values of α, generating for each α 1000 samples of networks each consisting
of N = 1000 nodes. For each realized network sample, we selected the subnetwork of
the 90 most connected nodes and calculated its mean degree z. Finally we selected
the α value which provided a mean degree z closest to 10. This set of parameters was
then used to produce the skeleton of Experiment 3 by generating a single sample of
a (directed) scale-free graph with N = 1000 nodes, and retaining its most connected
subnetwork of 90 nodes.
In order to build bank balance sheets, we assumed an LTI compatible speci-
fication of the buffer and exposure random variables as log-normally distributed
ehttp://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2011
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conditionally on the network topology:
∆v = (kvjv)
β1 exp[a1 + b1Xv] , (B.1)
Σv =
2
3
(kvjv)
β1 exp[a1 + b1X˜v] , (B.2)
Ωv = (kvjv)
β2 exp[a2 + b2X`]. (B.3)
where the collection {Xv, X˜v, X`} consists of independent standard normal ran-
dom variables. To fix the parameter values, first we arbitrarily set β1 = 0.3 and
β2 = −0.2, with the rationale that the default buffer should increase with bank
connectivity, while a larger number of counterparties should imply lower average
bilateral exposures. We used the reported Core Tier 1 Capital as a proxy for the
default buffers, and thus we matched the first and second sample moments E[∆v]
and E[∆2v] using equation (B.1). Since we found no proxy in the data for the
stress buffers Σ, we arbitrarily selected the same parameters as for ∆, but with a
prefactor 2/3. Finally, matching equation (B.3) with sample moments E[AIBv ] and
E[(AIBv )
2], from the aggregated interbank exposure data, gives us enough equations
to determine the full list of parameters: β1 = 0.3, a1 = 8.03, b1 = 0.9, β2 = −0.2,
a2 = 8.75, b2 = 1.16.
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